Objectives: The Health and Social Care Act 2012 introduced Clinical Commissioning Groups to take responsibility for commissioning (i.e. planning and purchasing) the majority of services for local populations in the English NHS. Constituted as 'membership organizations', with membership compulsory for all GP practices, Clinical Commissioning Groups are overseen by, and are accountable to, a new arm's-length body, NHS England. This paper critically engages with the content and policy narrative of the 2012 Act and explores this in relation to the reality of local policy enactment. Methods: Set against a careful review of the 2012 Act, a case study of a nascent Clinical Commissioning Groups was conducted. The research included observations of Clinical Commissioning Group meetings and events (87 h), and indepth interviews (16) with clinical commissioners, GPs, and managers. Results: The 2012 Act was presented as part of a broader government agenda of decentralization and localism. Clinical Commissioning Group membership organizations were framed as a means of better meeting the needs and preferences of local patients and realizing a desirable increase in localism. The policy delineated the 'governing body' and 'the membership', with the former elected from/by the latter to oversee the organization. 'The membership' was duty bound to be 'good', engaged members and to represent their patients' interests. Fieldwork with Notchcroft Clinical Commissioning Group revealed that Clinical Commissioning Groups' statutory duty to NHS England to 'ensure the continuous improvement' of GP practice members involved performance scrutiny of GP practices. These governance processes were carried out by a varied cast of individuals, many of whom did not fit into the binary categorization of membership and governing body constructed in the policy. A concept, the governing assemblage, was developed to describe the dynamic cast of people involved in shaping the work and direction of the Clinical Commissioning Group, many of whom were unelected and of uncertain status. This was of particular significance in Notchcroft Clinical Commissioning Group because the organization explicitly pursued a governance system based on developing positions of consensus. The governing assemblage concept is valuable in articulating the actual practices of Clinical Commissioning Group governance, how these relate to the normative content of the 2012 Act, and the tensions that emerge. Conclusions: The governing assemblage concept provided clarity in discussion of the dynamics of organizational governance in Notchcroft Clinical Commissioning Group, which did not follow the simple template articulated in the 2012 Act. The concept merits application in the study of other Clinical Commissioning Groups and may prove valuable in illuminating governance processes within a range of other health care organizations in different contexts. The governing assemblage holds promise for the analysis of ongoing changes to NHS organization, as well as international health care organizations such as accountable care organizations in the US.
Introduction
The 2012 Health and Social Care Act (HSCA12) represents the most extensive legislative reform of the English NHS. Introduced by the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition Government (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) (2014) (2015) , the HSCA12's centrepiece was the creation of Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs). Every primary care practice (known as GP practices) in England was legally required to become a CCG member, and CCGs were given responsibility for commissioning (i.e. planning and purchasing) most health care services for their patient populations, with the ability to purchase services from a market of providers. CCGs are responsible for spending approximately two-thirds of the NHS budget (£73.6 billion in 2017/18), 1 using a range of contractual mechanisms. The bodies previously responsible for commissioning, Primary Care Trusts (PCTs), were abolished, as were regional oversight organizations, Strategic Health Authorities. A new arms' length organization, NHS England, was created to take on day-to-day responsibility for the operation of the NHS under an annually renewed government mandate. NHS England was given responsibility for authorizing and performance managing CCGs as well as commissioning primary care services and the majority of specialized services for the entire English population. In 2015 (after this research took place), these responsibilities were amended, with CCGs given a role in commissioning primary care.
This was not the first NHS policy that introduced mechanisms to increase GP involvement in commissioning. 2 However, it went further than any previous reform by making CCGs statutory organizations, with compulsory membership for GP practices.
The HSCA12 and associated secondary legislation 3 made some stipulations regarding CCG structure and function. CCGs require a governing body, including a Chair, Deputy Chair, Accountable Officer, Chief Finance Officer, registered nurse, secondary care specialist, and two lay people. 3 Additional governing body members are permitted, but must be either CCG members or non-members specified in the CCG's publicly published constitution. Each CCG must have Audit and Remuneration subcommittees, chaired by lay members, responsible for overseeing the good governance of the organization. Beyond this, CCGs have significant latitude in deciding processes of operation and subcommittee structure. CCGs' constitutions, agreed by their members, were assessed and authorized by NHS England. Each had to include a list of all GP practice members, details of organizational decisionmaking processes, and subcommittee structure.
Studies exploring the creation and operation of CCGs highlight how the fragmentation of commissioning in the new system made accountability arrangements more complex. CCGs are accountable to multiple organizations and groups, and servicing these accountabilities may conflict or create unforeseen consequences, which threatens to undermine the autonomy CCGs were promised. 4, 5 Other studies note that the freedom CCGs had in establishing their organizational form means that they vary in size, committee composition, and remit, and in the roles GPs play. 6, 7 A study of eight nascent CCGs found that most adopted some form of locality structure, delineating subgroups of member GP practices (usually by geography), but there was variety in how much de facto responsibility these were given.
8 CCGs adopted one of three approaches to communication with their membership: one way, with members 'informed' by the governing body; limited two way, including attempts to capture 'useable intelligence' from GPs; and full two way, with the intention that the membership would steer the direction of the organization. 8 The HSCA12 was part of a broader decentralization and localism agenda. This included the Localism Act 2011, 9 presented as a means of achieving '. . .a substantial and lasting shift in power away from central government and towards local people' 10 and as part of a wider strategy to reduce bureaucracy and empower communities. 11 The HSCA12 was framed as solving the problems arising from overly centralized, management-heavy PCTs, which were said to lack effective clinical input. CCGs as membership organizations (composed of and accountable to GP practice members) would enable commissioning decisions to be made closer to those affected, i.e. patients. Empowering GPs to shape the health service was presented as desirable because they possess professional and local knowledge about patient needs. The espoused policy logic was that this increased localism, combined with GPs' (valorized) professional expertise, would make the NHS truly patient centred, and would lead to performance and efficiency improvements by, for example, using clinical knowledge to require providers to deliver improved outcomes at reduced cost.
This mechanism for better representing patients' interests raises an issue, however: meaningful representation of patients' interests by local GPs requires a significant proportion and range of GPs to be involved in the CCGs' work. GPs have specific knowledge about a limited local 'patch', and CCGs can cover large, sociodemographically varied areas. Legislation and policy guidance address this through the notion of the CCG as a membership organization. Thus, HSCA12 guidance emphasized the duty of all GPs to be active, productive members, presenting this duty as a fundamental part of their professional clinical responsibility. 12 The HSCA12 (schedule 2, paragraph 6) specifies CCGs '[. . .]must secure that there is effective participation by each member of the CCG in the exercise of the group's functions', 13 and assessment of this forms part of NHS England's CCG assurance framework. 14 Taking this understanding as a starting point, this paper explores the following question: how is the HSCA12, as a policy that casts CCGs as vehicles for realizing a desirable increase in localism and enhancing advocacy for patients' needs, enacted locally? In the paper, we explore issues of how policy 'gets done' locally, particularly how groups of actors are delineated and organized, and how normative justifications for policy relate to governance mechanisms within health care commissioning organizations. We develop a 'governing assemblage' concept to characterize the dynamic cast of people shaping the work and direction of the CCG, some of whom exist outside of the policy's delineation of 'membership' and 'governing body'. Dunleavy and Rhodes 15 showed how articulating a concept, such as the 'core executive', can facilitate new ways of understanding the complex operations of central government. The 'governing assemblage' concept has broad potential value across contexts and could be usefully applied more widely in the NHS and other health care systems.
Methods
Our analysis draws on 13 months (October 2012-November 2013) of fieldwork with Notchcroft CCG (a pseudonym). Notchcroft is a largely urban metropolitan area with significant variation in levels of affluence, health outcomes, and life expectancy. It encompasses an area with one main community services provider and an above-average number of acute and specialist hospitals (Foundation Trusts). The CCG is medium sized with a patient population of over 300,000 and over 80 member GP practices.
Eighty-seven hours of meetings (including governing body, committee, District, and Locale meetings) and other events were attended by JH, and contemporaneous field notes taken. Sixteen interviews were conducted, including with GPs and others on the governing body, managers, and GPs with little CCG involvement. Interview topic guides were tailored to each interviewee's role but all included questions about the membership organization status of the CCG, structure and governance processes, and history of Notchcroft in relation to previous national policy. These issues also guided observations. Interviews were audio recorded and transcribed, field notes were digitized, and all documents imported into NVivo 9 for analysis. This involved a combination of emergent coding and deductive coding based on a small set of themes corresponding to the interview topic guide (e.g. 'membership organization', 'clinical leadership'), which was itself developed in relation to the main features of the HSCA12. Analytical memos were created throughout and this process led to the development of the governing assemblage concept.
The following section presents field note extracts and interviewees' comments. Field note extracts are denoted by references containing the context and a meeting identifier (e.g. District1, Meeting1). Interviews are presented with an interview signifier and number, and the interviewee's generic role (e.g. Interview1, manager). Single quotation marks denote speech captured verbatim; quotation marks denote descriptions and/or paraphrased comments.
Results
We begin by describing the structure of Notchcroft CCG and its specified governance processes, with a particular focus on the CCG's local subdivisions involving GP practices: Districts and Locales. We then highlight the ambiguities in the identity and composition of the CCG and the divisions between 'the CCG' and 'the membership'. We consider the shifting cast of people shaping CCG decision-making, which leads us to develop the governing assemblage concept to more clearly articulate issues of CCG governance.
Organizational elements of the CCG
CCGs have considerable leeway in deciding their organizational structures. 6 At the time of data collection, Notchcroft had a governing body with six subcommittees, including both Audit and Remuneration committees (required by statute) and a Primary Care committee. The latter contained a further two 'levels' of subdivision: three Districts and twelve Locales. Figure 1 illustrates the organizational structure.
Governance processes -the CCG and its members
During the study period, Notchcroft governing body had 15 individuals with full voting rights, the majority of whom were GPs (including the three District leads and the Chair). It also included a number of other coopted, non-voting individuals, including the Director of Public Health (employed by Notchcroft Local Authority (LA)). Notchcroft's constitution set out the process whereby GP members would be elected to the governing body, and held to account, by their peers. It also stated that a CCG objective was for most governing body decisions to be reached through consensus. In keeping with this, no observed decisions were put to a vote during the study period.
District GP leads were elected by local GPs, but in some cases enthusiasm was low and candidates stood unopposed (Interview5, governing body GP). Districts held monthly, non-public, meetings, attended by District leads, CCG managers, Locale representatives, a patient and public involvement representative, and various others including nurses and LA public health professionals. It was not always clear on what basis these individuals were present. Only one District had formal terms of reference, and these had been developed by the lead District manager prior to the CCG's authorization. Locale meetings were also monthly, non-public, and attended primarily by GP practice representatives, the District GP lead, and usually a CCG manager. Standing items on District meeting agendas included governing body meeting feedback, locality updates, and care domain summaries. Locale meetings were similar, but also included District meeting feedback.
Notchcroft's constitution stated that Districts and Locales were intended to serve as service implementation conduits and innovation test beds. Districts were highlighted as vehicles for ensuring GP member practices were engaged in CCG strategy and decisionmaking. Each District was required to create a development plan reflecting the CCG's strategic objectives, and the Primary Care Committee was responsible for assessing performance against these. Participants most consistently described Districts and Locales as a system for communicating with members. Issues would be 'fed up' through Locales and Districts to the governing body or relevant subcommittee, and information would be 'cascaded' down in a limited two-way communication process. There was no explicit delegation of authority to Districts in the constitution, but Districts did take responsibility for some activities, as discussed below. When asked why both Districts and Locales were needed, interviewees explained that the Locale system had been in operation in parts of Notchcroft before the CCG, supporting cooperation between GP practices. Districts were created to resolve disagreements over whether Notchcroft should have one or more CCGs; an interviewee described them as a means of placating GPs who favoured multiple CCGs by protecting their 'local voice' (Interview10, GP practice manager). District leads provided updates at governing body meetings and represented their District's interests in decision-making.
The uncertain composition of 'the' CCG
Here we describe how the practicalities of CCG governance reveal inconsistencies between the presentation of CCGs as membership organizations in national policy and the realities of local enactment.
In 2013 a District meeting was observed where attendees -GP Locale leads (two of whom were CCG governing body members), managers, and a nurse -looked through practice performance data, including referral rates and patient satisfaction. They discussed how 'underperforming' practices could be approached, and what assistance to improve should be provided, noting the potential awkwardness of GPs policing one another. One GP argued that, while:
. . .the [local NHS England] Area Team are responsible for commissioning primary care. . .the CCG commissions most of everything else. The CCG is a membership organization but it has a role in ensuring continuous improvement, which is the task of the He referred to this dynamic as 'the lever'. The HSCA12 explicitly states that CCGs have a duty to assist NHS England in 'securing continuous improvement in the quality of primary medical services', 13 and this begins to illuminate the ambiguity surrounding the distinction between the CCG and the membership.
The HSCA12 simultaneously presents the CCG as the sum of its member GP practices, and as an entity tasked with assessing those members. The policy does, however, distinguish between the governing body and the membership, by making the formation of a governing body a statutory requirement via a process agreed and supported by member GPs. 12 Perhaps, then, when considering oversight and assessment of 'the' membership, 'the' CCG should be understood as the governing body. This perspective was articulated by a governing body interviewee (Interview8, Governing body-non-GP). However, publicly the message was different. At a District engagement event, a governing body GP stressed: 'The CCG is not the governing body, it is all of us' (District event).
The question of where the boundaries of the CCG and the membership lay in practice was difficult to answer. At a governing body meeting, a discussion explored how far 'the membership' should be involved in decisions about the performance criteria the CCG could chose to assess GP practices. An elected GP suggested it might be a 'powerful process' to ask GP practices what they thought should be included. An LA attendee said the CCG should take the opportunity to demonstrate its work as a membership organization (Governing body, Meeting4). However, others were anxious that being too open in canvasing opinions could create problems. At a subsequent District meeting, one GP noted: '(laughing) The trouble is if you ask people if they want more jam they will say yes' (District3, Meeting1), suggesting a potential conflict between the individual interests of GPs and the CCG's wider strategic interests.
Decision-making processes -who is involved?
Here, we look at examples that raise issues around who is involved in decision-making.
In a District meeting, the nature of 'the' CCG's performance assessment of GP practices was under discussion. A GP [7] , not elected to either District or governing body, was instrumental in this:
GP7: If the CCG is a supportive organization then contact with other practices should be shaped by this role. . . .
GP8 asked which [GP] practices were missing targets.
Someone said, ''name and shame'' and then ''it's for support'' (there was a bit of awkwardness about ''outing'' the practices). Manager1 read them out. GP7: maybe these practices need a visit from the CCG for support. (District1, Meeting1) Thus, the development of consensus around difficult decisions relating to peer review of performance was not simply shaped by elected or appointed officials with a formal status within the CCG; it was shaped by those who were present at particular meetings, including ordinary members and others.
During another District meeting in January 2013, the possibility of installing a defibrillator in every GP practice was discussed. A GP argued it was desirable, as it would provide a 'good news story for the CCG'. After initial agreement from the GPs present, including the Chair/District 1 lead, an LA representative argued strongly against the proposal, which she saw as not evidence based. She suggested funds could be used for something with more demonstrable efficacy, and argued that the CCG needed to have a clear decision-making process for such issues. Over the course of the discussion, the Chair/District 1 lead came around to her position. At the next governing body meeting, the District 1 lead presented District 1's position as being that the purchasing of defibrillators was undesirable. The idea was not pursued by the CCG (Governing body, Meeting4). This illustrates how an individual unaffiliated with a GP membership practice, employed by the LA and without formal status in the governance structure, had a key role in shaping a consensus opinion on an issue at District level, which became the CCG's official position.
These instances reveal tensions in the notion of 'the' CCG as a singular organizational entity constituted by its members. The identity of 'the' CCG was revealed to be contradictory or multiple and it became apparent that the simple compartmentalization of actors in the policy, i.e. 'the membership' and 'the governing body', was insufficient to describe the intra-organizational dynamics of what was occurring. While the HSCA12 specified 'the governing body' and 'the membership' and established relative rights between them, in reality, in Notchcroft CCG a broader cast of people, not fitting neatly into either category, were involved in governance processes.
A governing assemblage
Difficulties articulating the composition and governance dynamics of the CCG led to the development and utilization of a new concept: the governing assemblage. This refers to the shifting cast of people involved in CCG governance processes at different levels, some of whom, but not all, also sat on the governing body. Note that the word assemblage is not employed here in a Foucauldian or Deleuzian sense 16 ; it simply refers to the fact that 'the' assemblage was continuously being made and re-made between different intra-organizational contexts and, consequently, was difficult to understand as a fixed entity in the manner of, for example, the governing body. At District level, the governing assemblage discussed performance data and shaped decision-making about dealing with underperformers. While most governing body members were elected by local GPs in a process specified in the CCG's constitution, there was less transparency in Districts and Locales. District leaders were elected by local GPs, but it was unclear how other District and Locale attendees had come to occupy these roles, and most of these groups lacked terms of reference. This raises questions about the robustness of CCG governance and is dissonant with the notions of good governance championed in the HSCA12.
The governing assemblage had a role in oversight and assessment of GP practices. Some of the assemblage were simultaneously assessors and the assessed, whereas others only assessors. For some GPs, it was a struggle to reconcile their identity as a local GP with their role in the governing assemblage. For example, at a Locale meeting: 
Discussion
The Coalition Government presented the HSCA12 as a means of enhancing localism and self-evidently desirable subsidiarity to better represent patients' interests in the English NHS. 17 The vehicle for this was CCG membership organizations, composed of GP practices. Governmental rhetoric framed CCGs' membership organization status as what made them different and desirable, allowing a sufficiently broad range of GPs to be involved in commissioning activities to justify suggestions of enhanced patient advocacy. The membership would elect their peers to the governing body, but all GPs had a duty to be 'good' members, ensuring patients' best interests were pursued. In order to fulfil statutory obligations to NHS England, however, CCGs were required to engage in some degree of performance monitoring of their members. In Notchcroft, one GP referred to this as 'the lever', and the CCG's obligations associated with it revealed ambiguities in the identity and composition of the organization in terms of boundaries between 'the' CCG and 'the' membership.
Observing this intra-organizational 'fuzziness' led to the development of the governing assemblage concept to articulate the dynamic, shifting cast of people involved in shaping the direction of the CCG. In choosing this term, the aim is to capture the importance of assembling as the mechanism by which a relatively ad hoc and un-mandated group of actors comes together to discuss issues and make decisions which, as we have shown, went on to influence what the CCG did. Deleuze and Guattari 18 might describe a CCG as an assemblage of patients, professionals, buildings and various physical resources, local and national policies, as well as more abstract phenomena such as signs and utterances. We are not using 'assemblage' in this wider sense and do not suggest that the governing assemblage describes the CCG as an organization; in Notchcroft CCG, the macro level of the governing body and its subcommittees and the micro level of GP practices were relatively well defined in terms of governing processes and the cast of actors involved. However, at the meso level occupied by Districts and Locales, governing processes and the cast involved were notably more fluid, the assemblage being made and remade in successive meetings. The governing assemblage's activities had real consequences for CCG members, yet many individuals constituting the assemblage were of uncertain status: some were not affiliated with or employed by a GP practice member, and many were not elected or appointed to a position within the organization. The governing assemblage shaped consensus views in the most senior decision-making forums of the CCG and was involved in the performance management of member GP practices, but this influence was not reflected in policy documents, governance processes, or organizational charts. GPs involved in the work of the CCG were required to monitor their professional peers; these GPs were essentially 'bureaucratized' 19 as both targets and agents of policy. This was a source of identity dissonance for some GPs, and they puzzled about the meaning of the organization and their place within it. 20 In short, the activities of the governing assemblage had implications for the decision-making and direction of the CCG at the macro level, and the experiences of GPs at the micro level, and these were hard to parse precisely because of its opacity and fluidity. The official aspiration to devolve power to local GPs to better represent the interests of patients is, in practice, mediated through the operation of a largely unelected and uncertain assemblage of actors, with unspecified governance processes.
There is a broader potential value in developing this concept. In 1990, Dunleavy and Rhodes 15 argued that the established phrase 'cabinet government' was inadequate to describe the complex workings of central government. Not only did it 'mis-state the currently effective mechanisms for achieving co-ordination' by overemphasizing the primacy of the Cabinet, but also implied a 'normative ideal' about how central government should operate. Their response was to develop the concept of 'core executive studies' to describe a broader range of possible institutional arrangements and power dynamics within government, permitting cross-country comparisons and analyses. This opened up new possibilities for critical examination of the inner workings of government, 21 and demonstrates how the linguistic and conceptual tools at scholars' disposal have the potential to uncover previously inaccessible paths of analysis. The governing assemblage concept works towards this end but at a smaller scale. Its development has occurred through engagement with the prescriptions of the HSCA12 around localness, subsidiarity, enhanced patient advocacy, and professional knowledge. It reveals tensions in realizing these objectives due, in part, to the machinery of the policy itself.
The governing assemblage concept development arose from observations of a broad range of intra-organizational interactions in Notchcroft CCG. Some CCGs will have more thoroughly explicated and formalized governance arrangements, but the complexities we have highlighted are inherent in national policy. Whilst they may manifest differently in other contexts, we suggest that all CCGs will need to wrestle with similar issues, particularly as they expand their responsibilities into primary care. Previous research has highlighted the complexity of CCG accountability relationships, 5 organization, and governance 6 ; the governing assemblage concept provides a language which may facilitate exploration of these complexities. An ethnographically informed approach of 'being there' at meetings and events was integral to this endeavour, providing insights into how policy requirements were actually negotiated.
The NHS policy landscape evolves relentlessly. Most recently, Sustainability and Transformation Partnerships (STPs) have been mooted as a key vehicle for NHS operation and development, with NHS organizations obliged to become involved in order to access funding to pay down deficits. STPs have no legislative underpinning and have been criticized for their lack of transparency and stakeholder engagement. 22 The governing assemblage concept may be useful in understanding their development and progress. Other potential applications include exploring the governance of so-called New Care Models in England, and Accountable Care Organizations in the USA; in short, identifying, delineating, and understanding the role of governing assemblages in complex organizations may bridge the gap between formal governance processes and the messy reality of everyday management practice.
